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UNRAVELING SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S WATER/GROWTH

NEXUS: METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT POLICIES AND
SUBSIDIES FOR SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT, 1928-1996
STEVEN P. ERIE AND PASCALE JOASSART-MARCELLI*

INTRODUCTION

This article examines how regional water policies have shaped growth
patterns in Southern California, particularly postwar suburban development.
Nationwide, the dynamics of suburbanization are complex and multifaceted.
Transportation technology (e.g., the streetcar and automobile), cultural values, and federal highway and housing policies have been major contributory
factors.' Local and state policies have furthered processes of suburbanization. These include zoning and land-use controls, municipal incorporation
and taxation policies, and, in the case of Southern California, the provision
of county services to newly-incorporated suburbs.'

* Erie is an Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.
B.A., M.A., Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles. Jossart-Marcelli is a post-doctoral
research assistant in the Department of Geography, University of Southern California. B.A.,
M.A., Facultes Universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. Ph.D., University of
Southern California. This article is supported by a grant from the Southern California Studies
Center, University of Southern California, and the James Irvine Foundation. The authors wish
to thank Robert V. Phillips, Michael Schudson, Gary Arant, Howard Williams, Harold
Brackman and Gregory Freeman for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF SUBURBIA (1987); JOEL GARREAU, EDGE Crry: LiFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991).
2. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF
METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850-1970 (1976); MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLICS OF
EXCLUSION (1976); MARK GOTTDIENER, PLANNED SPRAWL: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS IN

SUBURBIA (1977); GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL
INCORPORATION (1981); JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987); WILLIAM FULTON, SPRAWL HITS THE WALL: RECENT
RESEARCH ON LAND USE POLICY AND REGIONAL GROWTH PATrERNS IN METROPOLITAN Los

ANGELES (1999).
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I. WATER AND GROWTH: CURRENT POLICY DEBATES

In the semi-arid West, there is widespread recognition that water has
played a crucial role in development Yet, there are few studies of how water policy may be an important contributory factor to suburban development
within regions such as Southern California. In one of the few intra-regional
analyses, Robert Gottlieb argues that the founders of the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (MWD or Metropolitan), "... immediately
established policies that were favorable to newly developing areas rather
than the city [of Los Angeles] itself .... These-policies were designed to
draw on the tax base of the developed areas while creating pricing incentives
for water use and development of the new areas.""
Have water policies in Southern California favored the suburbanizing
periphery at the expense of the central city? This study seeks to test this hypothesis. It examines the growth and equity effects of capital financing and
water rate policies of the Metropolitan Water District, the mammoth twentyseven member agency' water wholesaler serving over sixteen million customers in 250 communities. The lengthy time period examined, 1928 to
1996, spans the life of the agency and permits evaluation of policy changes
and their effects. A guiding question is the extent to which the City of Los
Angeles, owing to its large early investments in the Colorado River Aqueduct and limited use of MWD water, subsidized water provision to fastgrowing outlying areas such as San Diego and Orange Counties.
The Metropolitan Water District was created by state legislation in 1927
and incorporated the following year.6 In terms of customers served and territory, it is the largest water district in the United States. MWD's 5139 squaremile service area includes six counties or portions thereof: Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. The
gross regional product of MWD's service territory exceeds $500 billionthe eleventh largest economy in the.world.
3. See generally PETER WILEY & ROBERT GoTrLIEB, EMPIRES IN THE SUN: THE RISE OF
THE NEW AMERICAN WEST (1982); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDrrY,
AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986); NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT
THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s-1990s (1992).
4. ROBERT GOTrLIEB, A LIFE OF ITS OWN: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF WATER 126
(1988).
5. MWD member agencies (and date of entry) are: Anaheim (1928), Beverly Hills
(1928), Burbank (1928), Glendale (1928), Los Angeles (1928), Pasadena (1928), San Marino
(1928), Santa Ana (1928), Santa Monica (1928), Fullerton (1931), Long Beach (1931), Torrance (1931), Compton (1931), Coastal MWD (1942), San Diego County Water Authority
(1946), West Basin MWD (1948), Pomona Valley MWD (1950), Eastern MWD (1951),
Chino Basin MWD (1951), MWD of Orange County (1951), Foothill MWD (1953), Central
Basin MWD (1954), Western MWD of Riverside County (1954), Las Virgines MWD (1960),
Calleguas MWD (1960), Upper San Gabriel Valley MWD (1963), and San Fernando (1971).
6. See Metropolitan Water District Act, Ch. 429, California Statutes 1927, 694 (cited in
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: HISTORY AND FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT 313 (Charles A. Bissell ed. 1939) [hereinafter MWD HISTORY]).
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Given current policy debates, this is an appropriate time to examine the
region's water/growth relationship, cost-of-service equity between MWD
member agencies, and possible suburban subsidies. Today, Southern California faces a growing gap between its water requirements and assured supplies. At the same time, "smart growth" or sustainable development has become the leitmotif of policy discussions in California and the region These
concerns have encouraged the development of new water policies, particularly agriculture-to-urban water transfers. Approved in 1998, the landmark
transfer agreement of 200,000 acre/feet a year from the Imperial Irrigation
District (ID) to the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) has been
hailed as a promising solution to the looming water shortage in urban Southern California.' In 1999, MWD outlined its own plans to buy water on the
open market.9 Transfers are supported by many environmentalists who believe that, as a result, fewer dams and aqueducts will be constructed.
Yet, in terms of considering water transfers as a smart growth policy,
very little is known about their actual effects upon growth. Nor is much
known about their impact upon capital facility needs and financing, or upon
cost-of-service equity among the region's water agencies. An analysis of
past and current MWD policies, assessing their growth and equity effects,
can provide a valuable baseline for the debate over transfers."
Such a study also can inform policy and governance debates now occurring within Metropolitan and its member agencies. MWD is under new leadership, with both a newly installed chairperson and general manager, and is
considering new policy directions. Under the smart growth rubric, there is
interest in complementing conservation, reclamation and transfer measures
with rate restructuring involving new growth-based charges. The MWD
Strategic Visioning Project represents a comprehensive internal review of
the agency's mission, policies and governance; the State Legislature also is
examining these issues."
Within the San Diego County Water Authority, MWD's largest customer, there is a movement to unbundle the uniform or so-called "postage7. See CENTER FOR CONTINUING STUDY OF THE CALIFORNIA ECONOMY, LAND USE AND
THE CALIFORNIA ECONOMY: PRINCIPLES FOR PROSPERITY AND QUALITY OF LIFE (1998), available in <http://www.calfutures.org>.

8. See San Diego County Water Authority, Landmark Water Conservation and Transfer
Agreement Ratified, April 29, 1998 (press release); Steve LaRue, 'Historic' Imperial Water
DealApproved, SAN DIEGO UNION TRm., Apr. 30, 1998, at Al.
9. See Tony Perry, MWD to Buy Water on Open Market, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at

A3.
10. See Steven P. Erie, A San DiegofImperial Valley Water Deal: Who Stands to Gain?

Who to Lose?, METRO INVESTMENT REP., June 1997, at 19-20; Harold Brackman & Steven P.
Erie, Managing California'sNew Water Wars, in CALIFORNIA POLICY OPTIONS 1999, 45-50
(Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Patricia Nomura eds., 1999).
11. See LLOYD DIXON ET AL, IDENTIFYING AND EXPLORING THE POLICY ISSUES THAT

UNDERPIN A VISION FOR THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
(1998); DENNIS O'CONNOR, GOVERNANCE OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (1998).
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stamp" water rate-long a staple of MVWD and its member agencies-and
substitute a more equitable rate based upon the relationship between financial contributions and benefits among SDCWA's twenty-three member
agencies.' SDCWA officials also have begun quietly exploring whether to
secede from Metropolitan. 3 These debates too can profit from an understanding of MWD's record.
II. MWD AND REGIONAL GROWTH: A PARADIGMATIC CASE
Since MWD's creation, the pattern of growth in Southern California has
been one of massive and unrelenting suburban development. Between 1928
and 1996, the population of metropolitan Southern California has increased
ten-fold, from less than two million to over 18 million residents. The City of
Los Angeles, the original urban core, has grown from one million to 3.7 million residents-a 270% increase. The rest of Southern California has experienced far more prodigious growth-1300%, from one million to 14.3 million
in population. While the City of Los Angeles was the region's preDepression era growth leader, in the immediate post-World War Two era the
rest of Los Angeles County witnessed fast-paced suburbanization. By the
1960s, the fastest growing areas were San Diego and Orange Counties. More
recently, the Inland Empire (San Bernardino and Riverside Counties) has
emerged as the region's growth leader.
Population growth estimates for the region, 1996-2020, suggest little
slackening in the fervid pace of growth. In the next twenty years, Southern
California is forecast to grow by 40%--adding 8.7 million new residents, the
equivalent of two and one-half Chicagos.' The fastest growing areas are
predicted to be the exurban periphery: western Riverside County, San Bernardino County, northern Los Angeles County, southern Orange County, and
northern and southern San Diego County. Unless smart growth policies encouraging sustainable development are devised and implemented, the pattern
of suburban sprawl will continue, posing massive costs for the region's already-overburdened environment, quality-of-life, public services and infrastructure.
Very little of Southern California's staggering population growth to date
could have occurred without an adequate supply of affordable imported water. The region's climate is semi-arid, and local water supplies only can support a population of one million. In the early twentieth century, the City of
Los Angeles pioneered the development of imported water supplies, com12. See

ECONOMIC STUDY GROUP, DRAFT REPORT: ANALYSIS OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY

WATER AUTHORITY'S RATES, CHARGES, AND FEES wITH RESPECT TO COST OF SERVICE EQUITY

AMONG MEMBER AGENCIES (Brookman-Edmonston Engineering, Inc. ed. 1999). The County
of San Diego is an ex officio member of SDCWA.
13. See Michael Gardner, S.D. Thirstsfor Independence, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug.
11, 1999, at Al.
14. Population growth estimates prepared by the Southern California Association of
Governments (SCAG) and the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG).
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pleting its aqueduct from the Owens Valley in 1913."5 This allowed L.A. to
grow from one-half million to two million residents.
In 1928, Los Angeles and its suburbs joined in creating the Metropolitan
Water District in order to finance, construct and operate the Colorado River
Aqueduct to bring fresh supplies of imported water from the Colorado
River. 6 In effect, MWD created a "water wall" around Los Angeles, breaking up the city's water monopoly, which had been used as a potent force for
territorial expansion. '"Los Angeles' boundaries today are roughly the same
as they were in 1928. In this fashion, MWD helped underwrite the postwar
suburbanization of Los Angeles County, as over fifty new cities were incorporated. They formed municipal water districts and were annexed to MWD.
From the 1940s onward, as Colorado River water became available, outlying areas such as San Diego annexed themselves to MWD. As a result,
Metropolitan's service area has grown through annexation to encompass
most of urban Southern California. In the early 1950s, MWD established a
new policy, known as the Laguna Declaration, which pledged the agency to
find a permanent water supply for the region, and to provide water to anyone
who requested it in its service territory. 8 In 1960, California voters approved
the MWD- supported State Water Project, bringing a fresh supply of imported water (albeit representing only one-half of the California Aqueduct's
full capacity) from Northern California for distribution by Metropolitan and
its member agencies. 9
Given that Southern California is arguably the nation's paradigmatic
case for the water/growth nexus, this study focuses upon MWD capital financing and water rates and their growth and equity effects under two different policy regimes: (a) 1928-1970, when capital financing, such as for the
15. See generally VINCENT OSTROM, WATER AND POLITICS: A STUDY OF WATER POLICIES
AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF Los ANGELES (1953); ABRAHAM HOFFMAN,
VISION OR VILLAINY: ORIGINS OF THE OWENS VALLEY-Los ANGELES WATER CONTROVERSY

(1981); WILLIAM KAHRL, WATER AND POWER (1982).
16. See MWD HISTORY, supra note 6.

17. Interview with Robert V. Phillips, former General Manager and Chief Engineer, Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power (June 1, 1995).
18. The Laguna Declaration states:
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is prepared, with its existing governmental powers and its present and projected distribution facilities, to
provide its service area with adequate supplies of water to meet expanding and increasing needs in the years ahead. The District now is providing its service area
with a supplemental water supply from the Colorado River. When and as additional water resources are required to meet increasing needs for domestic, industrial and municipal water, The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
will be prepared to deliver such supplies.
Id. See also Statement of Policy Approved by the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Dec. 16, 1952, in SOURCE MATERIALS ON METROPOLITAN
WATER DISTRICT ACT § 135; PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS, Item 44 of supporting documents (1996).
19. See JOEL SCHWARZ, A WATER ODYSSEY: THE STORY OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 103-18 (1991).
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Colorado River Aqueduct, was property-tax based, and water rates were kept
below actual cost (requiring further tax subsidies) to encourage water sales
via annexation of outlying areas to MWD; and (b) 1970-1996, when water
rates were raised substantially to include both capital financing and cost recovery.
The analysis is organized into four sections. The first part examines
MWD capital financing and water rates in the pre- and post-1970 periods.
The second section analyzes fiscal subsidies between MWD's twenty-seven
member agencies in the two eras, focusing upon possible central
city/suburban transfers. A subsidy index is constructed for each member
agency, which compares its share of MWD water deliveries relative to its
share of financial contributions. A guiding assumption here is that interagency subsidies should be minimized. This study argues that tax-based water provision is an inequitable system. More equitable policies feature postage-stamp or uniform commodity charges with cost recovery or, as now is
being proposed, rates which reflect the actual cost of service. The third section examines possible growth-inducing effects of MWD water policies. For
Metropolitan's twenty-seven member agencies, correlations between subsidies and average annual population growth rates for the pre- and post-1970
periods are examined. The concluding section addresses normative concerns:
the fairness of past MWD policies, and the equity and growth issues raised
by water transfers.
In addition to MWD member agencies, counties are treated as primary
units of analysis since counties and their political subdivisions, not water
agencies, make land-use decisions and thus shape patterns of growth. Here,
member agencies' water deliveries, financial contributions and population
growth are aggregated to the county level." Much of the analysis employs
constant (1996) dollars to more accurately reflect member agency tax assessments and debt burdens for early large-scale projects such as the Colorado River Aqueduct. The data collected and analyzed include MWD member agency annual water sales and deliveries, revenue and taxes collected,
capital contributions, annexation fees and other charges. Member agency
population figures are from Metropolitan's annual reports.

20. Los Angeles County MWD member agencies include Beverly Hills, Burbank, Central Basin, Compton, Foothill MWD, Glendale, Las Virgines, Long Beach, Los Angeles,
Pasadena, San Fernando, San Marino, Santa Monica, Three Valleys, Torrance, Upper San
Gabriel Valley and West Basin. Orange County agencies include Anaheim, Coastal, Fuller-

ton, MVWD of Orange County and Santa Ana. Riverside County agencies are Eastern MWD
and Western MWD. San Bernardino County's member agency is Chino Basin MWD. San
Diego County's agency is the San Diego County Water Authority. Ventura County's agency

is Calleguas MWD.
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III. MWD POLICIES: PRE- AND POST-1970
A. CapitalFinancing
Although Colorado River water did not make its way to Southern California until 1941, when the aqueduct finally was completed, MWD began
collecting property taxes in 1929 to finance the $220 million project. Property taxes remained the principal means of MWD financing through the
1960s because capital projects could not generate revenue until they were
completed, and early water sales were inadequate for project financing. By
the mid-1940s, MWD was awash in water but not customers, forcing the
agency to sell water below cost in order to encourage greater purchases by
member agencies as well as possible annexations to Metropolitan. In 1947,
MWD only charged $15 per acre-foot for treated domestic water, a price that
slowly rose to $49 by 1970; by 1996, however, this rate had increased to
$426.21
Los Angeles, whose taxpayers paid 75% of the costs of the Colorado
River Aqueduct, drew little MWD water-only 8% of total deliveriesbecause the city continued to develop its own water supplies. In the 1930s,
Los Angeles extended its system to the Mono Lake Basin. Later, in 1970, the
city completed a second aqueduct to the Owens Valley. Owens Valley water
was far cheaper because it featured a gravity-flow system while MWD
needed costly pumping plants to move its Colorado River water over desert
mountains.
Starting in the 1960s, MWD began shifting its capital financing from
taxes to water sales. By then nearly all of the urban coastal plain had been
annexed to Metropolitan. Now it was easier for MWD to raise water prices
to recover costs. The State Water Project (SWP), begun in 1960 and completed in 1972-73, served as major catalyst for capital restructuring. Los Angeles demanded that the State Water Project, with its more expensive water,
be financed by water sales rather than taxes. San Diego, however, resisted.
The San Diego County Water Authority, MWD's largest customer, drew
one-quarter of its water but only had paid 10-13% in annexation charges
(representing back taxes plus interest) and property taxes since joining
MWD in 1946.
The Los Angeles/San Diego conflict resulted in MWD shifting much of
its capital financing from property taxes to water rates. In 1960, the MWD
Board of Directors adopted a new policy which required that at least onehalf of all capital expenses plus all operating and maintenance costs be borne
by water sales revenues.2 This partially allayed Los Angeles' concern that
21. See METROPOLITAN WATER DIsTRIcT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, THIRTY-FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 1972, at 147 [hereinafter MWD THIRTY-FoURTH]; METROPOLITAN WATER

DIsTRIcT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT 1997, at 128 (1997).
22. See Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
Resolution 5821 (1960) [hereinafter MWD Resolution 5821].
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MWD would continue to rely heavily upon tax revenues. A subsequent Los
Angeles lawsuit and, in 1978, the passage of Proposition 13 furthered the
shift in capital financing to water sales.23
As a result, there are two distinct MWD fiscal regimes: pre- and post1970. Table I shows the sharp shift in Metropolitan capital financing circa
1970.
Table 1
MWD Capital Contributions (in1996 dollars), 1929-1996
450.000.000
400,000.000
350,000.0
350,000.000

WCapitaltomWaterSales

aOcapital from Taxes

300,000.000
250.000.000
200,000.000
150.000,000
100.000,00
50,000,000
0

Fiscal Year

23. In 1960, SDCWA's MWD directors resisted raising MWD water rates to include
payments of principal and interest on bonded debt. Later, Metropolitan's Board of Directors
considered setting a higher price for State Water Project supplies (to include capital costs)
relative to Colorado River water. According to an unofficial history of Metropolitan Water
District Act provisions:
SDCWA and other heavy water users resisted the concept of any such difference
[in water price based upon] source amendment to the Act [to Section 133, derived
from the original Act's Section 5(10) and Section 6(8) (Stats. 1961, Ch. 862)]. A
majority of the board, though, approved.., a legislative draft containing this concept. However, the [Los Angeles] City's Department of Water and Power then entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with SDCWA (in order to dissuade
the Authority from lobbying for defeat of the bill). The Memorandum contained
these points:... [t]he legislation is permissive only ....
GEORGE FLEWELLING, DERIVATION AND HISTORY OF VARIOUS METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRIcT AcT PROVISIONS 93 (1985). Finally, starting in 1979 with the settlement of a lawsuit
brought by the City of Los Angeles regarding MWD water and tax rate setting policies, MWD
began to fully implement a water charge-based system of capital financing. See id. at 92-107.
See also MWD Resolution 5821, supra note 22; Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California, Resolution 7446 (1972); Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Minutes, November 13, 1979, at 9.
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The table displays annual capital contributions from taxes (and annexation fees paid by new member agencies) and water sales, 1929-1996, in constant 1996 dollars. Before 1970, virtually all MWD capital projects were
paid for by property taxes. After the early 1970s, as State Project water
flowed into Southern California, water sales became a major source of capital financing. Metropolitan's uniform or postage-stamp water rates (in which
all member agencies paid the same amount for similar kinds of water) now
were raised to include most capital, operating and maintenance charges.
By 1995, however, new capital financing policies were being created. In
response to reduced water deliveries, sales and revenues produced by a
lengthy drought coupled with the financing needs of an ambitious capital
improvement program, MWD adopted a new rate structure designed to shift
capital costs away from water rates and toward new, more stable charges.
These included a readiness-to-serve (RTS) charge to meet debt service needs
by guaranteeing water reliability and quality under normal demand; a
standby charge for unimproved land benefiting from legal access to MWD
water; and a new demand charge (since suspended) to recover capital costs
associated with meeting new demands on Metropolitan's system.'
B. Changes in Revenue Sources
The shift in capital financing circa 1970, coupled with an increase in
water rates to reflect the actual cost of service, dramatically altered MWD's
revenue sources. Table 2 shows the changing components of total MWD
revenue (in current dollars) 1929-1970, and 1970-1996.

24. See Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
Resolutions 8464-65 (1995).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999

9

California Western Law Review, Vol. 36 [1999], No. 2, Art. 4

276

[Vol. 36

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

Table 2
Components of Total Revenue Collected by MWD (incurrent dollars),
1929-1970 and 1970-1996

o Watersales
70%
60%

D Ta,:s

50%

o Annexaton
Fees

40%
c3Stanbyand
RTS charges

30%
20%
10%
0%

' '.'
1929-1970

1970-1996

In the pre-1970 period, taxes and annexation fees accounted for 75% of
agency revenue while water sales only amounted to one-quarter of MWD
revenue. Property taxes not only were the principal source of early capital
financing, they also were used to pay a significant share of operating costs.
By 1960, one-third of MWD's ad valorem tax rate was devoted to general
purposes rather than bond service.' Metropolitan had been forced to keep
water prices artificially low to make its water financially attractive to member agencies relative to groundwater usage, and to encourage annexations to
MWD. This strategy of giving water away, forcing further reliance upon
property taxes as the agency's principal revenue source, appeared to work.
The original thirteen member agencies, which had joined MWD between
1928 and 1931, later were joined by thirteen additional agencies annexed to
Metropolitan between 1942 and 1963. San Fernando, the twenty-seventh
member agency, joined in 1971.
For the post-1970 period, the relative magnitude of the two revenue
streams was reversed. Water sales now accounted for 75% of total agency
revenue. In contrast, taxes, fees and other charges only generated one-quarter
of MWD revenue. Increased water sales revenues reflected both the shift in
capital financing and MWD's willingness to raise water rates as annexation
was completed.

25. See MWD THIRTY-FOURTh, supra note 21, at 146.
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SUBSIDIES BETWEEN MEMBER AGENCIES

A. ComparingAgency Water Deliveries and FinancialContributions
One of the main findings of this research is that the City of Los Angeles,
and to a lesser extent the other founding member agencies of Metropolitan,
heavily subsidized later joining agencies by underwriting most of MVWD's
early capital costs, particularly for the Colorado River Aqueduct. In general,
water deliveries to the original members have not matched their financial
contributions.
Table 3 shows water delivery/financial contribution ratios for the City
of Los Angeles, the rest of Los Angeles County, and the other counties
served by Metropolitan, 1929-1996.
Table 3
Unit Cost (in 1996 dollars) per Acre Foot of MWD Water Delivered,
by County and the City of Los Angeles, 1929-1996
794

800700-- 6000

b 500349

3S

= 400-

a300200100-

0-

San Diego
County

Rtiverside Orange
County

County

San
Bernardino
County

Ventura
County

Average

Restl !LA
County

Oily orLos
Angeles

(Note: Financial contributions include MWD proceeds from water sales, taxes,
annexation fees, standby and readiness-to-serve charges.)
The ratios represent the total real contribution to MWD (in 1996 dollars)
per acre-foot of water delivered to each jurisdiction. Note the substantial differences in unit water costs for the City of Los Angeles relative to the rest of
Southern California. Los Angeles paid $794 per acre-foot of water, more
than double the $349 average. In contrast, San Diego, Riverside and Orange
Counties paid only $251, $270 and $290 per acre-foot, respectively.
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What explains these substantial unit cost disparities? Table 4 disaggregates MWD financial contributions (in 1996 dollars) for these jurisdictions
into four components: water sales, property taxes, annexation fees, and other
charges.
Table 4
Types of MWD Financial Contributions (in1996 dollars)
per Acre Foot of MWD Water Delivered,
by County and the City of Los Angeles, 1929-1996
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Thus, 74% of Los Angeles' financial contribution to Metropolitan has
come from taxes compared to less than 24% from water sales. In sharp contrast, only 28% of the San Diego County Water Authority's total contribution has come from taxes and annexation fees compared to 70% from water
sales. Similarly, two-thirds of Orange and Riverside Counties' member
agency contributions to Metropolitan have come from water sales and only
one-third from taxes and annexation charges.
As both tables reveal, the greatest disparities between MWD water deliveries and financial contributions are between the City of Los Angeles and
San Diego, Riverside and Orange Counties. Between 1929 and 1996, Los
Angeles only drew 8% of total MWD water deliveries, but paid (in 1996 dollars) 25% of total property taxes, 23% of capital charges, and 17% of total
MWD financial contributions. In contrast, the San Diego County Water Authority, whose member agencies provide for the county's water needs, has
received 26% of MWD's total water delivered, but in real terms, only has
paid 13% of MWD's taxes, 15% of the capital budget and 18% of overall
MWD's financial contributions. Similarly, Orange County's five member
agencies have drawn 21% of MWD water deliveries, and only have paid
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16% of MWD taxes, 17% of capital costs, and 18% of revenue."
Most of Orange County's disparity is produced by one agency, the Municipal Water District of Orange County (MWDOC). The county's three
smallest agencies, Anaheim, Santa Ana and Fullerton, were MWD founders,
joining between 1928 and 1931. A fourth agency, Coastal MWD, annexed in
1942. However, MWDOC, the county's largest agency which draws 70% of
its Metropolitan water deliveries, only joined MWD in 1951. Riverside
County's member agencies with low unit costs are Eastern and Western
MWD, having joined Metropolitan in 1951 and 1954, respectively.
The reasons for the large unit cost disparities between Los Angeles and
San Diego, Riverside and Orange Counties are complex. They have to do
with the City of Los Angeles' heavy initial tax payments for the Colorado
River Aqueduct; SDCWA's, MWDOC's, and Eastern and Western IVIWD's
small assessed valuations (and thus few back taxes paid via annexation
charges) when joining Metropolitan in the postwar era; L.A.'s limited use of
MWD water as a supplemental source versus SDCWA's reliance as a primary source; San Diego, Riverside and Orange Counties' heavy utilization
of lower-cost MWD water for agricultural purposes; and MWD's use of
property taxes rather than water sales to finance capital projects prior to
1970.
B. ChangingSubsidy Patterns: Pre-and Post-1970
The pronounced shift in MWD capital financing and revenue sources
circa 1970 suggests that there may be different subsidy patterns in the preand post-1970 eras. Table 5 shows this to be the case.

26. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WATER DELIVERY
IN ACRE FEET BY MEMBER AGENCY THROUGH MARCH 31, 1996; TAXES BY IIEMBER AGENCIES

THROUGH MARCH 31, 1996; TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS [BY MEMBER AGENCIES], NOMINAL VALUE
AND PRESENT VALUE [THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1995-96]; TOTAL REVENUE COLLECTED BY
MWDSC FROM THE MEMBER AGENCIES THROUGH MARCH 31, 1996.
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Table 5
Estimated Subsidies (in 1996 dollars), by County and the City of Los Angeles,
1929-1970 and 1971-1996
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(Note: The subsidy is computed by calculating the difference between total
MWD financial contributions and actual water sales.)
Here we measure the magnitude of the financial overpayment or underpayment to Metropolitan (in 1996 dollars) relative to actual water deliveries
for the City of Los Angeles, the rest of L.A. County and the other counties
served by MWD, for 1929-1970 and 1971-1996. The table graphically
shows that most of the inter-agency subsidies occurred in the pre-1970 period. In the 1929-1970 period, the City of Los Angeles overpaid $1.42 billion and the rest of L.A. County $59 million in MWD contributions relative
to water deliveries. In contrast, the San Diego County Water Authority underpaid $701 million relative to MWD deliveries while Orange County
member agencies underpaid $631 million. MWDOC, with a $531 million
underpayment, generated most of Orange County's subsidy. Riverside
County's pre-1970 subsidy was much smaller ($173 million), reflecting its
limited MWD purchases given ample groundwater supplies. In essence, Riverside's member agencies joined MWD to provide for future growth. However, there is little early subsidy pattern evident for MWD member agencies
in San Bernardino and Ventura Counties.
Table 5 demonstrates that after 1970, with the postage-stamp water rate
rising to reflect most MWD expenses, suburban subsidies were significantly
reduced, but not eliminated. Los Angeles continued to overpay-the City by
$487 million and the County by $250 million-and San Diego to underpay
(by $621 million) while Orange and Riverside Counties' subsidies largely
were eliminated.
Table 6 highlights a different way of estimating subsidies between sub-
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regions for the two time periods. Here, to control for differences in member
agency size, water deliveries and financial contributions, we calculate the
real cost per acre foot of water delivered.
Table 6
Unit Cost (in 1996 dollars) per Acre Foot of MWD Water Delivered,
by County and the City of Los Angeles, 1929-1970 and 1971-1996
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(Note: Costs estimates are computed by dividing total financial contributions by total water delivered (in acre feet) to each member agency.)
The unit cost is obtained by dividing the total financial contribution of
each member agency by the quantity of water delivered. As with the previous table, Table 6 shows that there were significant early cost disparities. For
1929-1970, the City of Los Angeles paid $1670 per acre foot of MWD water
while member agencies in Ventura (Calleguas MWD) and San Bernardino
(Chino Basin MWD) Counties paid $439 and $655, respectively. Given that
Ventura and San Bernardino unit costs, 1929-1996, closely approximate the
overall regional average, these pre-1970 figures are anomalous. Calleguas
only joined MWD in 1960 to receive State Water Project deliveries and,
through 1970, had paid annexation charges but had received little MWD water. Chino Basin, which had joined in 1951, chose to draw little MWD water
in the pre-1970 period relative to its payment of annexation fees.
The high pre-1970 unit costs make the City of Los Angeles appear a fiscal profligate. Yet, as noted, L.A. early on heavily relied upon its own water
supplies, taking few MWD deliveries before the advent of the State Water
Project. Hence, the retail cost of water to Los Angeles customers remained
relatively low and did not represent an inhibitor to development. Also of
note is the high early unit cost for the remainder of Los Angeles County$453. From 1928 to 1931, ten of L.A.'s suburbs had joined MWD, fully con-
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tributing to the financing of the Colorado River Aqueduct while generally
drawing Metropolitan water as a supplemental source.
In dramatic contrast, in the pre-1970 era San Diego, Riverside and Orange County water agencies only paid $211, $229 and $199 per acre foot,
respectively. As noted, their low unit costs were driven by small assessed
valuations (and thus low annexation fees and early property taxes) coupled
with large water deliveries, particularly for agricultural use. For example,
SDCWA and MWDOC paid $34 million and $32 million in annexation
charges, respectively, which represent 10% shares of total MWD annexation
charges.2 After 1970, though, as MWD's water rates were raised substantially, unit cost disparities among member agencies were reduced.
Why did the City of Los Angeles so heavily contribute to early MWD
capital financing, in effect subsidizing water provision to suburbanizing San
Diego and Orange Counties? Robert Gottlieb argues that L.A.'s MWD directors were acting in their capacity as developers and investors:
Though the city of Los Angeles's representatives dominated the new MET
[MWD] board and management, they immediately established policies
that were favorable to newly developing areas rather than the city itself.
They did so in part as developers in their own right, and as participants
and leaders in the urban-development complex that transcended the
boundaries of particular municipalities. These policies were designed to
draw on the tax base of the developed areas while creating
pricing incen28
tives for water use and development of the new areas.
In actuality, this explanation appears overdrawn. MWD's original policies, as found in the Metropolitan Water District Act, were written by lawyers, not developers. The key bill drafters were William Burgess Mathews,
former L.A. City Attorney and Department of Water and Power (DWP) Attorney and first MWD General Counsel, and James Howard, Pasadena City
Attorney and Mathews' successor as MWD's General Counsel. For capital
financing, they turned to existing models. In that era, capital improvements
were financed by general obligation bonds, approved by voters, and paid for
by property taxes. In the early twentieth century, Los Angeles was one of the
nation's leaders in securing voter-approved, taxed-based financing for its
ambitious water, power and harbor projects. Only later would the city shift
to a revenue-bond strategy to finance new infrastructure projects.
The drafters also assumed that Los Angeles would draw a substantial
portion of MWD water deliveries. This would have substantially lessened
27. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
CHARGES BY MEMBER AGENCY THROUGH MARCH 31, 1996.

ANNEXATION

28. GOTMUEB, supra note 4, at 126.
29. See Steven P. Erie, How the Urban West Was Won: The Local State and Economic
Growth in Los Angeles, 1880-1932, 27 URBAN AFFAIRS Q. 519-551 (1992); Steven P. Erie,
From Regional Imperium to Pacific Rim Gateway: Los Angeles as a Developmental CityState, in FROM CHICAGO TO L.A.: RECONSIDERING URBAN THEORY (Michael Dear & Philip
Ethington eds., forthcoming 2000).
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the city's delivery/contribution disparity. Yet, in the 1930s, as Arizona
sought Congressional redress and began filing federal lawsuits against California to re-allocate Colorado River allotments, L.A.'s water officials realized that their Colorado River priority rights were less secure than originally
thought. Thus they began developing more secure supplies in the Owens
Valley and Mono Basin.
The Metropolitan Water District Act also conferred substantial benefit,
as well as cost, to Los Angeles. Although the city would bear the brunt of
financing the Colorado River Aqueduct and had bestowed its substantial
Colorado River water entitlement upon MWD", it was offered substantial
inducements. The Metropolitan Act conferred preferential rights to water,
such as during times of scarcity, on the basis of property taxes and other financial contributions for MWD capital and operating costs, exclusive of water sales.' In 1996, Los Angeles had a preferential claim to 24% of MWD
water relative to SDCWA's 13% claim and MWDOC's 11% share. 2 In effect, Los Angeles bought an expensive drought insurance policy should its
Owens Valley supplies prove insufficient. Los Angeles also was assured a
major role in MWD policymaking when assessed valuation, the basis for
property taxes levied, became the basis of board representation and voting.
To protect smaller member agencies, though, Los Angeles only was given
50% of the initial weighted vote-in effect guaranteeing it a veto--even
though, on the basis of assessed valuation, the city was entitled to 75%.
As MWD board directors were installed, they primarily acted as guardians of Metropolitan's fiduciary interests. As Gottlieb admits, "[a]fter Colorado River water arrived in the Basin in 1941, so much surplus water was
available at first that MET practically offered to give it away for free in or' By encouraging
der to establish a more substantial revenue base."33
water
sales, low annexation charges and price incentives would enhance MWD's
long-term revenue stream and thus allow for subsequent readjustments in the
relative financial burdens of older and newer member agencies.

30. On June 28, 1924, the City of Los Angeles filed with the state authorities for a flow
of 1500 cubic feet per second--equivalent to 1.1 million acre feet annually-from the Colorado River. Los Angeles' original filing, which was transferred to Metropolitan, represents
90% of MWD's Colorado River priority rights. MWD's other Colorado River entitlement
consists of the City of San Diego's filing for 112,000 annual acre feet. San Diego granted its
filing to MWD upon annexation in 1946. See MWD HISTORY, supra note 6, at 36; SCHWARZ,
supra note 19, at 84-86.
31. See Metropolitan Water District Act, § 5 1/2, Ch. 323, California Statutes 193 1. Preferential rights now appear in section 135 of the Metropolitan Water District Act, Chapter 209,
California Statutes 1969, as amended. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, SOURCE MATERIALS ON METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ACT § 135
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS (1996).
32. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, MWD ACT § 135
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO PURCHASE WATER (June 1996).
33. GOTTLB, supra note 4, at 126.
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V. TESTING THE SUBSIDY/GROWTH RELATIONSHIP

To what extent have MWD capital financing and water rate policies,
and resulting inter-agency subsidies, been growth-inducing, contributing to
the region's suburban sprawl? To answer this question, we have performed a
correlation analysis between the subsidy scores for the twenty-seven member agencies, expressed as their real cost per acre foot of MWD water delivered, and their average annual population growth rates since joining Metropolitan. As Table 7 shows, there are wide variations in average annual
growth rates for the City of Los Angeles, the remainder of Los Angeles
County, and the other counties served by Metropolitan, 1929-1970 and
1970-1996.
Table 7
Average Annual Population Growth Rate,
by County and the City of Los Angeles, 1929-1970 and 1970-1996
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(Note: The average annual population growth rate between 1929 and 1970 is
calculated from the year member agencies joined MWD.)
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Because of the smaller population base in the pre-1970 period, early
growth rates are much higher and show greater variation. Los Angeles City
and County, because they already were settled, experienced lower annual
growth rates than sparsely settled Orange, San Diego and Ventura Counties.
Sub-regional differences persisted after 1970, with annual population increases in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties four times as great as the
City and County of Los Angeles.
Table 8 compares unit water costs per acre foot and average annual
population growth rates for the three leading cases of central city/suburban
fiscal transfers: the City of Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties,
1929-1970 and 1971-1996.
Table 8
Unit Covst
(In 1996 dollaxs) per Acre Foot and Population Growth Rate, Orange and San Diego Counties
and the City of Los Angeles 1929-1970 and 1971-1996
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The table graphically illustrates the early subsidy/growth relationship
for these three key jurisdictions. Prior to 1970, Los Angeles paid dearly for
its MWD hookup but only grew at a moderate 2.2% annual growth rate. In
contrast, San Diego and Orange Counties paid little for MWD infrastructure
and water provision in the earlier period but experienced double-digit annual
growth rates. For all three jurisdictions, however, the water/growth relationship substantially weakens after 1970.
The early subsidy/growth relationship also appears to hold for all
twenty-seven MWD member agencies. Table 9 displays the correlation between member agency real (inflated-adjusted) cost per acre-foot of water de-
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livered and average annual population growth rate, 1929-1970.
Table 9
Correlation between Water Subsidy Index and Population
Growth Rate by Member Agency, 1929-1970
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(Note: The subsidy index is computed by dividing the amount of water delivered (in acre feet) by the contribution paid (in 1996 dollars) for each member
agency. The average annual population growth rate is calculated from the year
member agencies joined MWD.)
The relationship is quite robust, with R2 = .383. The coefficient fundamentally is driven by two key agencies-the San Diego County Water
Authority and the Municipal Water District of Orange County.
Finally, Table 10 displays the correlation for the member agency subsidy/growth relationship, 1971-1996.
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Table 10
Correlation between Water Subsidy Index and Population
Growth Rate by Member Agency, 1971-1996
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(Note: The subsidy index is computed by dividing the amount of water delivered (in acre feet) by the contribution paid (in 1996 dollars) for each member
agency.)
As expected, for the later period the correlation is sharply reduced but
not eliminated, with an R2 = .136. Thus, MWD capital financing and water
pricing after 1970 appear much less growth inducing.
As noted, these bivariate correlations should be treated as exploratory
and suggestive. Regional growth is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon,
and is not driven solely by any single variable. Key growth determinants include land availability and price, zoning and land-use controls, local taxes,
and infrastructure (such as transportation), education and amenities. Yet, the
subsidy/growth relationship for the pre-1970 period is surprisingly strong,
and suggests the need for further research. However, the ready availability of
inexpensive water may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
growth in a semi-arid region such as Southern California. If the cost of water
were a sufficient condition, lowering Los Angeles' MWD unit costs from
nearly $1700/acre foot, 1929-1970, to less than $500/acre foot, 1971-1996,
should have sparked a greater growth surge than actually occurred.
In this case a multivariate analysis is complicated by the fact that while
many demographic, economic and policy variables are available at the
county and city levels, they are not available for member agencies which are
not coterminous with county or city boundaries. Such agencies include both
incorporated and unincorporated areas, making data comparability and
analysis difficult.
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WATER POLICY, EQUITY AND GROWTH

This analysis suggests that MWD's pre-1970 policy of relying upon ad
valorem property taxes for capital financing and many operating expenses
produced substantial cost-of-service disparities between member agencies
and favored new suburban development at the expense of the central city and
older suburbs. MWD's founding member agencies, such as the City of Los
Angeles, paid their full complement of property taxes but, in general, used
the system as a supplemental water source. In contrast, agencies such as the
SDCWA joined MWD in the postwar era, paid relatively small annexation
fees and relied upon MWD as a primary water source. The result was a substantial early water provision subsidy of over $1.3 billion from Los Angeles
City and County to suburbanizing San Diego and Orange Counties.
How fair was this early tax-based financing system? Should new suburban areas have been subsidized by established urban centers like Los Angeles in the same way a nation might protect infant industries or parents might
indulge a child until maturity? According to Gottlieb, an argument can be
made that MWD's founders and early directors were pursuing a policy of
enlightened self-interest, creating a suburban hinterland and thus greater
economic opportunities for the core urban center. As noted, a case also can
be made that when faced with a possible stranded asset such as the Colorado
River Aqueduct, MWD officials pursued a rational long-term strategy of encouraging annexations and water sales so that rates could be raised at a later
date. One wonders what the thirteen original cities' MWD costs would have
been if outlying areas had not been encouraged with financial incentives to
join the Met family.
Yet, there is growing evidence that subsidies have unwanted consequences. Because beneficiaries fight ferociously to maintain their privileged
status, subsidies have a tendency to become self-perpetuating. The protracted battle over shifting MWD capital financing from property taxes to
water rates offers vivid testimony in this regard.
In recent years, with central city decline and rampant suburban sprawl,
it has become clear that urban centers can no longer be called upon to subsidize the suburban periphery. Indeed, there is growing realization that the fate
of metropolitan areas fundamentally depends upon the prosperity of the central city.34 Smart growth advocates now call for the elimination of subsidies
encouraging sprawl. Because newly developed areas require greater capital
investments, a cost-of-service logic suggests they should pay additional, not
reduced, charges for services such as water provision.
MWD's post-1970 shift from tax-based financing to a rate structure featuring substantial cost recovery has resulted in a more equitable and less
growth-inducing water policy. The new rate system reduced many cost-ofservice disparities among member agencies and resulting subsidies. Yet, Los
34. See generallyDAVID RUSK, CiTrEs WrHoUT SUBURBS (2d ed. 1995).
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Angeles' subsidy of water provision to other member agencies, particularly
San Diego, continued-although at one-half the level as previously. As
noted, since 1970 Los Angeles City and County have overpaid $737 million
and San Diego has underpaid $621 million relative to their respective water
deliveries. While a portion of San Diego's lower water costs are due to agricultural discounts (which come with lessened water reliability), MWD's
continued reliance upon property taxes for up to one-third of its capital financing (designed to generate a stable dedicated revenue stream and thus
lower borrowing costs) saddles Los Angeles, with its large tax base, with a
disproportionate share of MWD costs.
Overall, between 1929 and 1996 the taxpayers and ratepayers of the
City of Los Angeles have overpaid $1.9 billion and L.A. County residents
$309 million relative to their MWD water usage. In contrast, San Diego
County residents have underpaid $1.3 billion, Orange County residents
nearly $700 million, and those living in Riverside County $225 million relative to their MWD water usage. As a result, the metropolitan core has subsidized water provision to the suburbanizing periphery by over $2.2 billion.
But MWD's strategy of piggybacking much of its costs onto water
charges has not been without risks. It has made the majority of capital financing dependent upon water sales and revenues. In the early 1990s, as
MWD embarked upon an ambitious capital program while suffering
drought-induced declines in water sales and revenues, the limitations of this
rate structure became evident. Hence, MWD adopted new chargesreadiness-to-serve, standby, and new demand rates-to firm up capital financing and create greater equity between established and rapidly growing
areas for financing the capital projects needed to accommodate new growth.
Yet, the postage-stamp rate and new growth charges created incentives for
major customers such as the San Diego County Water Authority to reduce
their large and growing MWD capital financing burdens by purchasing nonMWD water through transfers.
With the advent of water transfers, the postage-stamp rate has been under sharp attack. To date, the California courts have rejected Metropolitan's
validation lawsuit seeking a postage-stamp rate (including system-wide
costs) for short-term conveyance-or wheeling-of transferred water
through the Colorado River Aqueduct.35 Instead, the courts have embraced
the concept of incremental or point-to-point wheeling costs. Given MWD's
current financing system-roughly 80% of its costs are fixed; 75% of its
revenue comes from water sales-any reduction in water revenues, such as
when member agencies substitute transfers for MWD purchases, could portend significant cost shifting to other member agencies.
The question needs to be raised whether transfers such as the
IID/SDCWA agreement are more about guaranteeing water reliability or re35. See Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of the
Validity of the Fourth Supplemental Resolution for Commercial Paper and Revolving Notes,
Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 164076, January 30, 1998.
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ducing capital financing burdens. While SDCWA claims it is buying reliability given its limited preferential rights to MWD water, the state Water
Code governing water shortage emergencies appears to make preferential
rights unenforceable.36 Instead, critics have argued that San Diego is seeking
to insulate itself from a fair share of MWD capital project financing, such as
for the $2.2 billion Eastside Reservoir, by positioning itself to purchase less
water from (and furnish less revenue to) Metropolitan in the future.
The IID transfer also could help insulate San Diego from proposed
growth-based fees, such as Metropolitan's now-suspended new demand
charge, designed to recover system development costs to meet the needs of
fast-growing areas. Also of concern is whether transfers, by reducing supply
pressures, might lessen the incentive for sustainable-development policies
such as conservation and reclamation.37 In back-to-the-future fashion, transfers may herald a return to regional water policies that are growth inducing
and result in significant cost-of-service inequities.
This study suggests a complex relationship between water policy and
suburban development, and between the City of Los Angeles, its older suburbs and the rest of suburban Southern California. The Metropolitan Water
District, ostensibly the creature of "imperial Los Angeles," for forty years
subsidized suburban sprawl and the regional periphery, particularly San Diego and Orange Counties, at the expense of the taxpayers and ratepayers of
the metropolitan center. A post-1970 policy shift reduced L.A.'s suburban
subsidization to one-half of its previous level, but did not end the intraregional conflicts over who benefits and pays for water policy.
San Diego, Metropolitan's most heavily subsidized customer, likes to
portray itself as a David fighting for water independence against the socalled dictatorial MWD Goliath headquartered in Los Angeles. However, the
SDCWA's demand that MWD charge only nominal wheeling rates for water
purchased from the Imperial Valley could further institutionalize this longterm pattern of subsidization by other MWD member agencies. San Diego's preferential status, which in the past was paid for by Los Angeles city
and county residents, now could come disproportionately at the expense of
the region's fastest growing areas-Riverside and San Bernardino Counties.
Thus, the future friction point in regional water policy may not be between
Los Angeles and San Diego but between the "old" (San Diego and Orange)
and "new" (Riverside and San Bernardino) growth peripheries.
Ultimately, the question of the region's water policies and its subsidized
beneficiaries recalls a Thomas Nast cartoon about the Tweed Ring, which
ran New York City in the Civil War era. Nast portrays the most notorious
grafters standing in a circle, each pointing his finger at the culprit next to
him. So too, with the politics of water subsidies in Southern California. The
region's "usual suspects" are eager to point the finger at each other rather
than pay their fair share for water provision and sustainable development.
36. See CAL. WATER CODE § 350 (West 1953).
37. See sources cited supra note 10.
38. See id.
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